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Translation, Semiotics and Ideology 
Susan Petrilli 
1. Semiosis as translation 
Victoria Welby (1837-1912) describes man's capacity for signification 
in terms of "translative thinking," an automatic process "in which 
everything suggests or reminds us of something else" (Welby, 1983 
[1903], p. 34). Translated into semiotic terms we could say that 
translative thinking is a semiosic process in which something stands for 
something else, in which different sign systems are related, in which 
one sign is more fully developed, enriched, criticized, put at a distance, 
placed between inverted commas, parodied or simply imitated, and, in 
any case, interpreted in terms of another sign. Translation is a method 
of investigation and discovery, says Welby (1983, p. 150), of 
verification and acquisition of knowledge and development of critical 
consciousness: 
As language involves both unity and distinction (the one 
actually and the other implicitly), language must itself be 
recognised as a means of discovering contrasts together with 
the links which constitute these elements of unity, or at least 
completely exclude the idea of final disparateness [...] For a 
thing is significant, both in the lower and in the higher sense, 
in proportion as it is expressible through bare sign or pictorial 
symbol or representative action. In the higher sense (that of 
vital or moral or rational import) it is significant in proportion 
as it is capable of expressing itself in, or being translated into, 
more and more phases of thought or branches of science. The 
more varied and rich our employment of signs [...], the greater 
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our power of inter-relating, inter-translating, various phases of 
thought, and thus of coming closer and closer to the nature of 
things in the sense of starting-points for the acquisition of fresh 
knowledge, new truth (italics my own). 
We could develop such intuitions in the light of more recent 
results of studies in language theory and the science of signs generally 
and state that semiosis, that is, the situation in which something 
functions as a sign, cannot subsist without translation for semiosis is 
itself a translation-interpretation process. The role of translation is 
fundamental in the very constitution of the sign, both verbal and 
nonverbal, in the very determination of its meaning. As observed by 
Augusto Ponzio (1981) in a paper entitled "Polisemia e traduzione," the 
intimate connection between signs and translation emerges when we set 
the category of replaceability as a necessary condition of signness, 
when the sign is considered not only as something that replaces 
something else, but that may also in its turn be replaced by something 
else. Consequently, meaning is defined as a class of verbal and 
nonverbal sign materials in which these materials may replace each 
other reciprocally, in which, that is, an interprétant sign may act as a 
possible alternative to a previous less developed interpreted sign. In 
other words, as insistently stated by Charles Sanders Peirce 
(1839-1914), a sign subsists thanks to another sign acting as its 
interprétant, so that its meaning is its translation into some further sign. 
It subsists only in relations of reciprocal translation and substitution 
among signs with respect to which the original sign is never given 
autonomously and antecedently. 
In the citation above Welby explicitly states that "while 
language itself is a symbolic system its method is mainly pictorial" 
(ibid., p. 38). Through recourse to Peirce's most basic tripartition of 
signness into symbolicity or conventionality, indexicality and iconicity 
(cf. Peirce, 1931-1958, 2.247-2.249; also Letter of Oct. 12, 1904 from 
Peirce to Welby, in Hardwick 1977, pp. 22-25), we could "translate" or 
"reword" this sentence as follows: "if verbal language itself is a 
conventional system its method is mainly iconic." In other words full 
recognition is given to the role of iconicity in the development and 
multiplication of signifying processes, to the iconic relation of 
hypothetical similarity in verbal language. 
234 
Reference here to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) in the interpretation of Ponzio (cf. 
1991, pp. 185-201) is instructive. Wittgenstein distinguishes between 
names and propositions: the relation between names or "simple signs" 
used in the proposition, Welby's "bare sign" as reported above, and 
their objects or meanings, is of the conventional type. In fact, being 
arbitrary, the rule or code relating the sign to the object to which it 
refers cannot be discovered simply by guessing: sign arbitrariness is a 
category proposed by Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) in his book 
of 1916 to characterize certain types of signs - verbal signs, or words 
taken singly, and nonverbal signals. On the other hand, the relation 
between whole propositions or "propositional signs," Welby's "pictorial 
symbol" and "representative action," and what they signify, their 
interprétant, is a relation of similarity, that is, of the iconic type. 
Wittgenstein's "proposition," like Welby's "pictorial symbol" and 
"representative action," are complete signifying units with a high 
potential for semiotic resonance. 
In his Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein develops the 
role of situational context in the completion of the proposition's 
representative and therefore signifying function. Thus contextualized, the 
"proposition" is transformed into "utterance" as understood especially 
by Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975), who made a thorough analysis of this 
particular category with reference to the Russian word vyskazyvanie (cf. 
Bakhtin 1986; Bakhtin-Volosinov 1973; 1987). The utterance, when 
dominated by an iconic relation between the interprétant sign and the 
interpreted sign is, as Bakhtin demonstrated, a dialogic relation of 
"answering comprehension" with a lesser or higher degree of alterity. 
Accordingly it is endowed with a varying capacity for criticism, 
cognitive innovation, and creativity. 
In relation to Wittgenstein, Ponzio (1991, pp. 198-199) makes 
the following observation: 
Even though propositions are also no doubt 
conventional-symbolic, they are based fundamentally upon the 
relation of representation, that is, upon the iconic relation and, 
similarly to Peirce's "diagrams," this relation is of the 
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proportional or structural type. Consequently, in Wittgenstein's 
view, the proposition is a logical picture. 
To know a proposition, says Wittgenstein, means to know the situation 
it represents; furthermore, comprehension of a proposition does not 
require that its sense be explained, for "a proposition shows its sense" 
(4.022). Hence while "the meanings of simple signs (words) must be 
explained", "with propositions [...] we make ourselves understood" 
(4.026). The importance of Wittgenstein's picture theory for a better 
understanding of the processes of language production and, by 
extension, of signification generally, is commented by the same Ponzio 
(ibid., p. 199) in a way that we could easily apply to Welby: 
[...] as a logical picture, representation tells of the mechanism 
that produces propositions and explains how language, through 
propositional signs, is able to escape the pure and simple 
convention of names, which would render [language] altogether 
repetitive. The question invests the mechanism of the 
production and development of thought given that "a logical 
picture of the facts is the thought" and that "a thought is a 
proposition with a sense" [Ponzio is here referring to 
propositions 3 and 4 of the Tractatus]. 
For both Welby and Wittgenstein of the Tractatus language 
analysis must not merely limit itself to the surface description of 
signifying phenomena, of language and thought, but must account for 
the production processes of such phenomena. At this point we shall 
simply signal a connection with the reflections of Ferruccio Rossi-Landi 
(1921-1985) on the specific notions of common speech» linguistic work 
and, in a more mature phase of his theoretical elaborations, social 
reproduction (cf., for example, Rossi-Landi 1961; 1968; 1985; see 
below). 
The work of Welby, Wittgenstein, Bakhtin and above all Peirce 
helps account for the more complex levels of signification, expression 
and communication — and not as they are reduced, that is, to the mere 
function of information and message exchange. Each of these scholars 
calls our attention to the importance in communication of iconic 
representation and alterity, of establishing relations among signs even 
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beyond systemic restrictions. Such an orientation also helps to highlight 
the dialectic nature of ongoing interprétative-translative interactive 
processes between "unity and disparateness", as Welby says in the 
citation above, between the centripetal forces and the centrifugal forces 
operating in language, as Bakhtin would say (1981, p. 272), between 
centralization and decentralization, between monolingualism and 
plurilingualism, monologism and polylogism, identity and alterity. 
Thanks to such dialectics, knowledge and truth are never given once 
and for all, but rather are open to continual investigation and 
modification in a process of constant renewal and adaptation to ever 
new communicative requirements, at the level of simple everyday 
exchange as well. 
We shall now refer to Roman Jakobson's (1896-1982) analysis 
of translation and connect it with Peirce's subdivision of signs into 
symbols, indexes and icons. Any one given sign (identifiable as such 
only by abstracting from real semiosic processes for the sake of 
analysis) is the product of dialectic interaction among conventionality, 
indexicality and iconicity even if one of these aspects prevails in a 
given sign situation. By considering this Peircean tripartition in 
conjunction with the analysis of translative-interprétative processes as 
proposed by Jakobson, we obtain a more adequate specification of the 
relation between translation and signs and a more precise, and yet 
broader, characterization of the interprétative-translative processes 
constituting and proliferating in our semiosphere. 
In his paper "On Linguistic Aspects of Translation", Jakobson 
(1971, pp. 260-266) distinguishes three possibilities of translating or of 
interpreting verbal signs: 1) intralingual translation or rewording which 
refers to the interpretation of verbal signs by means of other signs of 
the same language; 2) interlingual translation or translation proper 
which refers to the interpretation of verbal signs by means of some 
other language; 3) intersemiotic translation or transmutation which 
refers to the interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of 
nonverbal sign systems. Each of these translative-interprétative 
modalities presents a relative predominance of conventionality, 
indexicality or iconicity, a relative predominance in the relation between 
a sign and its interprétant of the symbol, index or icon. Furthermore, 
these three types of translation as identified by Jakobson are always 
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interrelated, are more or less co-existent with a relative predominance 
of one or the other. For example, in interlingual translation, for a full 
understanding of the sense of the object of translation and its adequate 
rendition in the "target" language, it will also be necessary to 
continually resort to intralingual translation in each of the two languages 
in question. 
When conventionality predominates, the relation between a sign 
and its object (or referent) is established by a code. This occurs in 
verbal language, and is the kind of relation alluded to by Welby when 
she says that " [verbal] language [..] is a symbolic system." We know 
that reference to the code in the decodification of linguistic elements is 
an inevitable aspect of translative processes, especially in the initial 
phase of text decipherment. At this level distancing between interprétant 
signs and interpreted signs is minimal, the mere activity of recognition 
and identification being of first importance. 
Moreover, relations of an obligatory nature also intervene 
between signs and their interprétants. Insofar as it is compulsory, this 
relation takes on the aspect of indexicality as intended by Peirce. To 
mechanical necessity a bilingual dictionary adds the relation of 
contiguity — proper to the index, says Peirce, jointly with causality — 
between the sign and its interprétant, when it places the vocable and its 
equivalent(s) in the target language alongside each other. Therefore, 
interlingual translative processes present indexicality in addition to mere 
conventionality. It is in this perspective that we may read Wittgenstein's 
observation on translation from the Tractatus (1961, 4.025): 
When translating one language into another, we do not proceed 
by translating each proposition of the one into a proposition of 
the other, but merely by translating the constituents of 
propositions. 
Indexicality refers to the compulsory nature of the relation 
between a sign and its object, a relation regulated by the dynamics of 
cause and effect, of spatio-temporal necessary contiguity, pre- existent 
to interpretation. Where indexicality predominates 
translation-interpretation processes simply serve to evidence 
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correspondences where they already exist. The degree of creative work 
involved is minimal. 
Bakhtin, who envisages communication and social intercourse 
in terms of dialectic and dialogic interaction between identity and 
alterity, introduces another two categories important in his analysis of 
verbal language though extensible to other sign systems as well: 
"theme" (smyst) and "meaning" (znacenie), or if we prefer, "actual 
sense" and "abstract sense" (cf. Bakhtin-Volosinov, 1973, p. 106). The 
second term in these pairs covers all that which is identical, 
reproducible and immediately recognizable each time the utterance is 
repeated — it concerns the meaning of linguistic elements, e.g. 
phonemes and monemes, forming the utterance. "Meaning" thus 
intended corresponds to signality rather than to signness, to the 
"interprétant of identification," rather than to the "interprétant of 
answering comprehension," to "plain meaning," rather than to plurivocal 
meaning, to translation processes (and phases) where the degree of 
dialogicality and distance regulating the connection between interprétant 
sign and interpreted sign is minimal. "Theme," instead, refers to all that 
which is original and unreproducible in an utterance, to its overall sense, 
signifying import and evaluative orientation as such aspects emerge in 
a given instance of communicative interaction. This category accounts 
for communication and signifying processes in terms of answering 
comprehension, dialectic-dialogic response, multiaccentuality — it 
concerns translation-interpretation processes capable of qualitative jumps 
in knowledge and perception, of amplifying the semantic polyvalency 
of discourse, of opening new ideological horizons. As says Bakhtin 
(ibid., p. 100): 
Theme is a complex, dynamic system of signs that attempts to 
be adequate to a given instance of generative process. There is 
reaction by the consciousness in its generative process to the 
generative process of existence. Meaning is the technical 
apparatus for the implementation of theme. 
In interlingual translation, iconicity, or the iconic relation 
between a sign and its interprétant, is present as well. Indeed, this 
relation is determinant for without it the sense of discourse could not be 
rendered, and well might we state that if translation processes remain 
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at the level of conventionality and indexicality, the translator ends in 
failure. When in relation to translative-interprétative processes Welby 
states so simply and clearly that the method of language is pictorial, she 
is evidencing a component of verbal signs irreducible to indexicality or 
to conventionality. The translator must necessarily deal with this 
component by moving beyond the conventions and obligations of the 
dictionary and entering the live dialogue among national languages, 
among languages internal to a given national language, among verbal 
signs and nonverbal signs. The presence of iconicity in interaction 
between interprétant signs and interpreted signs in translative processes 
involves dialogism and alterity to a smaller or greater degree. 
Iconicity implies that the relation between a sign and its object 
is not wholly established by rules, by a code, as in the case of symbols, 
does not preexist with respect to the code, as in the case of indexes, but 
rather is invented freely and creatively by the interprétant. This is 
something that the interpreter, in our case the translator, must inevitably 
keep account of given the task of having to render the original 
interprétant with the interprétant of another language. In the case of 
icons, then, the relation between a sign and its object is neither 
conventional, nor necessary and contiguous, but hypothetical — it 
corresponds to Bakhtin's "theme," or "actual sense." 
Where the relation between a sign and its object, between 
varying different types of signs, is regulated by the iconic relation of 
similarity, affinity and attraction, as Peirce would say (cf. 1956), 
ongoing interprétative-translative processes forming the signifying and 
cognitive universe are founded upon dialogism, alterity, polyphony, 
polylogism and plurilingualism — all essential properties of language 
which render such things as critical awareness, experimentation, 
innovation, and creativity possible. 
What has been said à propos interlingual translation is also 
valid for intralingual and intersemiotic translation. It has also been 
observed that interlingual translation implies the other two types of 
translation. Hence the translative process always involves a process of 
interaction between the three types of sign- interprétant relation as 
identified by Peirce and the three modalities of translation as identified 
by Jakobson. 
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Once the fact that meanings subsist and flourish in translation 
processes has been recognized, the importance of the relation between 
identity and alterity and of plurilingualism generally, both internal and 
external to a single language, emerges more clearly. In the framework 
of the semiotics of interpretation, and as especially the studies of 
Bakhtin have revealed, it has now become obvious that communication 
is a primary function of human language when it is viewed not in its 
potential for the transmission of messages, but when first importance is 
attributed to such properties as the capacity for: imprecision, vagueness, 
ambiguity, inscrutability, concealment, reticence, the unspoken, allusion, 
implication, simulation, imitation, pretence, semantic pliancy, polysemy, 
polylogism, plurilingualism, alterity — all of which determine the very 
possibility of communicative interaction. 
Concrete live speech is possible thanks to continual translation 
operations on the side of both production and interpretation in the 
passage from one code (linked to class, linguistic register, idiolect, 
genre, etc.) to another, from one language to another, from one 
communicative context to another. For successful 
communication-translation, "active comprehension" is necessary. This 
involves speakers' abilities to adapt and reformulate their own language 
to suit their interlocutors, to reflect metalinguistically upon their own 
language in the effort to specify what they mean through recourse to 
interprétants from the language of others, to reflect metalinguistically 
upon the language of others in order to specify their meanings in terms 
of interprétants from their own language. "Active or answering 
comprehension" concerns the theme or actual sense of an utterance. It 
is achieved thanks to dialogic relations among different languages and 
codes which permit operations of rewording, transposition, and 
transmutation in the deferral among interprétants as they substitute for 
each other without, however, ever perfectly coinciding. 
Far from being a compact, unitary and monolithic phenomenon, 
human language may be described as a live signifying process, a 
process in constant renewal generating different idioms, different 
discourses, different logics and points of view thanks to a predominant 
tendency towards decentralization and otherness. Plurilingualism and 
polylogism, both internal and external to a single language, derive from 
the possibility verified in human language of distancing, of expressing 
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points of views that are other, different worldviews: indeed human 
language develops in its plurality and multiplicity as a function of this 
very possibility. 
Remembering the words of George Steiner (1975), we may add 
that language thus intended is the main instrument that man has at his 
disposal for refusal of the world as it is, that is, as a static and coherent 
block. Even though each language presents, to a greater or lesser 
degree, its own particular reading of reality, it is thanks to its inherent 
alterity and to the possibility of translating, of moving across different 
languages and cultures, that man discovers the almost disconcerting 
pleasure of freedom. From this point of view, as observed by Thomas 
A. Sebeok (1981), language not only concerns the real world, but also 
infinite possible worlds, and this gives man that particular freedom 
which, to use the title of Sebeok's book, may be called "the play of 
musement." 
2. Translatability and untranslatability 
2. L Translation and the theory of linguistic relativity 
The following quotation is taken from a book of 1973 by Rossi- Landi 
dedicated to the problem of Ideologies of Linguistic Relativity as stated 
in the title (with particular reference to the work of Benjamin Lee 
Whorf and Edward Sapir): 
Language (le langage) is the dialectical sum of a language 
(une langue) and common speech. [...] The generative and 
self-extensive power of a language is therefore not a property 
inherent in it, but comes from the fact that we use it when we 
speak, and in this use of it, we bend it to our purposes. 
Language-in-general is everything that is used for linguistic 
production. In this production, as in any other, we can 
distinguish (1) a constant capital, which is the language 
[langue], (made up of linguistic materials, instruments, and 
'money'), (2) the linguistic working processes constituting 
common speech, and (3) a variable capital constituted by the 
linguistic workers, that is the speakers. The generative and 
self-extensive power usually attributed to the language as such 
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[langue] is thus a characteristic of language-in-general, more 
or less as the growth of constant capital is in reality a 
characteristic of production viewed as a whole. But in 
linguistic production, as in material production, it can happen, 
and indeed it usually does, that the constant capital takes on a 
sort of apparently autonomous, monstruous life of its own, 
subordinating to itself those expenders of linguistic labour 
power, without whom it could never have formed nor could it 
continue to exist (Rossi-Landi, 1973, p. 63). 
As implicitly indicated by his recognition of "the generative 
and self-extensive power" of a language, and his criticism of extreme 
forms of linguistic relativity which view languages as closed, separate 
and self-sufficient universes unable to communicate among themselves, 
Rossi-Landi supports the thesis of interlingual translatability. As distant 
as languages may be from a cultural point of view, as in the case of 
languages deriving from different families such as the the Amerindian 
and European, translation is always possible. "After all we do succeed 
in translating," says Rossi-Landi (ibid., p. 53) and even where codes, 
expressions and propositions cannot remain identical or at least similar 
in the transferral from one language to another, it will still be possible 
to reconstruct one language in terms of the other either by describing 
the first metalinguistically or by expanding the second. "An ability to 
speak a given language implies an ability to talk about this language," 
says Jakobson (1971, p. 262) who calls our attention to the 
complementarity of the object level and the metalinguistic level of 
language. In fact, had linguistic universes been mentally 
incommensurable, says Rossi-Landi, it would never have been possible 
for Whorf or anyone else to describe linguistic universes distant from 
our own, in English, while at the same time theorizing on the 
impossibility of such operations. As says Rossi-Landi (1973, p. 54): 
Every culture is capable of being informed IN its language as 
to the limitations of its own experiences, including those OF 
the language itself; and it is also possible to complete any 
language and thus any culture with certain aims in view, 
abandoning the level of mere metalinguistic description of 
what takes place in another language to move to that of the 
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re-elaboration, or, at least, the correction and enlargement of 
the very code which is being used. 
This position finds support in the work, for example, of the 
same Jakobson who, echoing Peirce, states that "any sign is translatable 
into a sign in which it appears to us more fully developed and precise." 
And continuing: 
All cognitive experience and its classification is conveyable in 
any existing language. Whenever there is a deficiency, 
terminology can be qualified and amplified by loanwords or 
loan-translations, by neologisms or semantic shifts and, finally, 
by circumlocutions (Jakobson 1971, p. 263). 
To support the thesis of translatability does not imply that 
languages equal each other, that their underlying structures are identical 
or that their vocables may be superimposed. The thesis of translatability, 
of communicability among languages does not imply adherence to 
linguistic universalism, to the belief that the great plurality of different 
languages may be reconducted to a single language, to an Ursprache, 
to universal linguistic structures, or to innate mental structures and, 
ultimately, to a monologic view of reality. Languages always maintain 
a margin of alterity and distancing with respect to each other, not only 
in the more obvious case of the different natural languages, but also in 
situations of internal plurilingualism. Indeed, as stated earlier, the 
capacity for differences and distances, for variation in point of view and 
linguistic register is a necessary requirement and the very condition of 
communication. In the words of Ponzio (1981, p. 38): 
Languages are always endowed with their own specificity, with 
reciprocal alterity however strong their cultural proximity may 
be, and in any case, indeed, I would say, precisely because of 
this it is possible to translate a text from one language to 
another. 
It is thanks to alterity that we are able to operate at a 
metalinguistic level not only within one and the same language, but 
across different languages, different sign systems. The target language 
offers the possibility of greater metalinguistic distancing with respect to 
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the source language and, therefore, it makes further materials available 
for the development of the chain of interprétants. Indeed, the 
metalinguistic function compensates for the situation of non 
identification among the linguistic universes of different languages 
which at the same time, however, in spite of their reciprocal alterity, as 
observed previously, are not incommensurable. 
From the dynamics between identity and alterity derives the 
possibility of realizing different forms of reported discourse — direct, 
indirect and free indirect — and their variants (cf. Bakhtin-Volosinov, 
1973). The different forms of reported discourse correspond to as many 
different ways of relating reporting discourse to reported discourse, of 
perceiving, reformulating, representing the discourse of others, to the 
different ways of translating the discourse of others into one's own 
discourse. Furthermore, as demonstrated particularly by Bakhtin (cf. 
1984a; 1984b), the dynamics between identity and alterity, between the 
various forms of reported discourse, is a determining factor in the very 
production and proliferation of the different literary genres. In relation 
to poetic language Jakobson (1971, p. 266) states that "poetry by 
definition is untranslatable," indeed, 
Only creative transposition is possible: either intralingual 
transposition — from one poetic shape into another, or 
interlingual transposition — from one language into another, 
or finally intersemiotic transposition — from one system of 
signs into another, e.g., from verbal art into music, dance, 
cinema, or painting. 
All the same, in spite of what would seem to be described as a 
limitation, by referring to Bakhtin we could state that thanks to the 
action of alterity and dialogism in language, poetic language included, 
this very transposition is in any case and always in some way possible. 
Returning to the passage quoted above from Rossi-Landi, a 
language's potential for expressing and communicating anything from 
some other language, far from deriving from some arcane quality 
inherent in a superindividual reality called langue, is the result of a 
dialectic interaction between langue and what Rossi-Landi calls common 
speech — the interpersonal and collective set of techniques underlying 
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expression and communication and common to all individual speakers: 
in other words, "the generative and self-extensive power of a language" 
does not coincide with the langue but is connected with 
language-in-general. 
Rossi-Landi develops his thoughts upon language and 
signifying processes generally in a Marxian framework. Thanks to this 
approach he comes up with such notions as "linguistic production," 
"reproductive capacities inherent in all languages," "linguistic work," 
"linguistic use," "linguistic instruments," "linguistic materials," and 
"linguistic workers," underlining the dialectic-dialogic interrelation 
among all these components for the successful realization of 
communication. The implication is that human language is first of all 
a social reality, which means that it is a live, mobile and dynamic 
reality always in the making through ongoing linguistic production and 
reproduction processes — the result of interaction between langue and 
common speech. Rather than just view language as something given, 
clearly defined and definitive then, Rossi-Landi too (see also 1968; and 
1973), like Welby, Peirce, Bakhtin and Wittgenstein before him, 
contributes, from yet a different angle, to focusing on the actual 
processes of linguistic production, upon the processes that make 
expression and communication possible. 
Supporters of extreme forms of linguistic relativity and 
therefore of the thesis of interlingual untranslatability, says Rossi-Landi, 
confuse langue with langage, reductively putting the former in the place 
of the latter while separating it from speech, so that the global process 
of linguistic production is replaced by a part — constant linguistic 
capital. Remembering that difficulties in interlingual translation concern 
langue and not speech, nor langage or linguistic production generally, 
to replace langage with langue means that any "new work" carried out 
by speech in that very same langue (constant capital), that any 
modifications eventually effected upon the constant capital (langue), are 
ignored. 
Another significant misunderstanding underlying the thesis of 
interlinguistic untranslatability consists in confusing the use of products, 
of already existing linguistic capital, with production, in attributing to 
the system of products properties which in fact belong uniquely to 
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work. In other words, individual speakers use linguistic products which 
they partially reproduce. Such products are the result of historico-social 
production processes and never of individual labour viewed in isolation. 
Mental processes do not exist separately from linguistic work but 
coincide with it. Consequently linguistic use does not necessarily 
condition thought in a one way process, but the two elements 
intermingle in the process of linguistic reproduction, in its turn part of 
a global dialectically interactive situation of economic, social and 
cultural relations. 
This description captures the reality of language in all its 
dialectic dynamism which as such is endowed with the potential 
capacity of looking at one linguistic universe with the eyes of another, 
or of reproducing or generating one linguistic universe within the ever 
flexible boundaries of another — "plasticity" or "elasticity" in fact is a 
characteristic of language theorized by Rossi-Landi, similarly to Welby, 
as a condition of the very continuity of its existence and development. 
Indeed, for both authors, the plasticity and signifying pliancy of 
language is a fundamental quality in maintaining its adequacy as a 
means for the expression, communication and eventual acquisition of 
new knowledge, in adapting to ever new linguistic uses and purposes, 
to ever new communicative contexts, thus constituting a necessary 
condition for the successful realization of interpersonal communication. 
22. Translation, semantic gaps and sign residues 
Even in the case of closely related languages, translation is at times 
difficult, inadequate or practically impossible (on a scale of difficulties 
we could place a scientific treatise at one extreme and poetry at the 
other). Obstacles to communication among different universes of 
discourse, among different languages, may be present systematically at 
various levels. The following are some brief examples, proposed by 
Rossi-Landi, of relative untranslatability resulting from a confrontation 
at various levels between the superficial signifying structure of the two 
natural languages, English and Italian: 
1) vocabulary, where difficulties arise because of the greater 
or lesser availability of corresponding terminology. Italian words 
generally carry more meanings than the English simply because they are 
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less numerous. This phenomenon, which has historical causes and is 
open to various interpretations, has been designated by the term 
polysemantism. An immediate example is the Italian "vitello" which is 
rendered in English by either "calf or "veal" depending on whether we 
are speaking of a live animal or a serving of meat; 
2) syntax, where problems of untranslatability would seem to 
be more serious and concern not only syntactic correspondences at a 
formal codified level, but also the signifying capacity that words may 
assume in various contexts. The proposition expressed in Italian with 
either "Giovanni disse chiaramente" and "chiaramente disse Giovanni" 
if translated according to the rules as "John said clearly," loses a shade 
of meaning in English; 
3) concept families, where noncorrespondence between the two 
languages may give rise to such serious cases of untranslatability that 
not even context or paraphrase can offer an adequate solution. The 
distinction in English between "sense" and "non-sense" and 
"meaningful" and "meaningless" do not find their exact Italian 
equivalents in "senso" and "non-senso", or in "significante" and "non 
significante". In relation to this particular semantic field it is worth 
noting that Frege's distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung has been 
rendered in English (by no less an authority than Russell) by meaning 
and denotation while in Italian, however, it is rendered by senso and 
significato on translating from the German, and by significam and 
denotazione on translating from the English. 
Despite the existence of areas of untranslatability, and even if 
stylistic elegance must at times be sacrificed, it is generally agreed, we 
have observed, that the universes of discourse of even distant languages 
more or less cover each other. The extent of such reciprocal coverage, 
which does not exclude areas of untranslatability in one language, or 
introduction of new signifying material in another, may be verified, says 
Rossi-Landi, in terms of communication as it is effectively realized 
across languages (though for some concepts it is more a question of 
expressibility in two or more languages than of communication among 
languages), and of the status of eventual "residues". 
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If we consider the concept of "sign residue" in relation to 
translation, viewed in terms of the connection between signs and 
interprétants, we soon become aware of how useful this concept may be 
in understanding the non-exhaustive and never definitive character of 
the work of translation, just as the work of interpretation is never 
exhaustive or definitive. In fact, the sign residue is the uninterpreted 
sign residue of the interpreted sign in relation to a given interprétant 
sign and constitutes that part of semiotic materiality which enables a 
sign to be translated into any number of interpretative itineraries — 
without ever necessarily losing its initial sense because of this. The 
uninterpreted sign residue constitutes the very condition of the sign's 
ambiguity, polysemy and otherness, which determines the fact that even 
if produced by an original signifying intention, once this sign is freed 
from its source it is open to infinite possible interprétative-translative 
developments (on these aspects see also Ponzio, 1990b, pp. 15-74; see 
also Petrilli, 1990b, pp. 373-380). 
Reciprocal coverage among different languages, which, as 
should now be obvious, never attains perfect correspondence, may be 
measured from the viewpoint of the material forming languages 
historically, that is, by confronting the level of development of 
phonological and morphological complexes, of verbal material, as well 
as by confronting the level of development of civilization in its various 
aspects, of socio-cultural material, including the nonlinguistic and the 
ideological, to which languages belong and of which they are the 
expression. Such an analysis cannot simply be dealt with satisfactorily 
in terms of a classification of translation difficulties manifest at the 
level of signifying structure. 
2.3. Translation and common speech 
On the basis of what kind of signifying material, asks Rossi- Landi, is 
a philosopher able to uphold, at one and the same time, both the 
individuality of his work in its historical and cultural determinations, as 
well as its universal relevance to mankind? For a more profound 
understanding of such questions which goes hand in hand with an 
understanding of the underlying processes involved in situations of 
intralingual, interlingual, and intersemiotic communication, the proposal 
is that we proceed by identifying a level of reference common to all 
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languages, that we inquire into a sort of a priori of language — in the 
Kantian sense —, a pre- linguistic level intended as all the operations 
that constitute and make speaking and communication possible: 
Rossi-Landi's "common speech." Such common territory, which enables 
the passage from one universe of discourse to another and 
communication among and of the various natural and technical 
languages, can only be identified by focussing on the processes that are 
constantly at the basis of the empirical procedures carried out by 
whoever is producing language — whether translating, teaching or 
learning it. This is research into the pre-linguistic level of language, into 
language in its connection with thought (cf. Rossi-Landi, 1961, 240ff). 
Common speech refers to all the common operations necessary 
in speech for successful communication among human beings. It refers 
to the basic similarities in biological and social structure uniting all 
human communities beyond historical and geographical differences. As 
the set of social techniques necessarily used by all speakers, common 
speech underlies all natural, special or technical languages. In the face 
of smaller or greater areas of untranslatability, this common set of 
techniques makes translation processes in any case possible. And as 
Ponzio (1990c, p. 125) specifies in one of his numerous studies on 
Rossi-Landi: 
The notion of common speech does not oppose that of 
plurilingualism [...] On the contrary, precisely because common 
speech is nothing more than a similarity of functions fulfilled 
by the various languages in satisfying needs of expression and 
communication, it can explain and justify the difference, 
variety, and multiplicity of the different languages as being due 
to the variety in expedients, solutions and resources that each 
language offers [...] for the satisfaction of the basically similar 
social needs of expression and communication. 
Common speech does not reconduct the multiplicity of 
languages to a mythical original language, to an Ursprache, to the 
universal linguistic structures of Logos or to some biological law 
governing all human languages. This is further explained by 
Rossi-Landi in his important 1968 book, Language as Work and Trade, 
and in subsequent writings where, in the perspective of historical 
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materialism, the notion of common speech is reformulated, as 
mentioned above, in terms of work, that is linguistic work (and later of 
social production): 
The similarity of the functions fulfilled by the various 
languages is derived from the fact that in the process of 
language development the general forms of social formation, 
that is, the basic work and production relationships that 
separate any human society from any pre-human (only) animal 
society, are necessarily represented (Rossi-Landi, 1968; Eng. 
trans. 1983, p. 41). 
The theory of common speech seeks to explain linguistic use 
and not simply describe it as did the Oxonian analytical philosophers (in 
LWT Rossi-Landi criticizes Wittgenstein's notion of use as developed 
in Philosophical Investigations, maintaining that the linguistic unit is 
analysed as something that is already given without inquiring into the 
social processes that produce it, so that its social character is left aside). 
Rather than describe linguistic use as it is realized in a given natural 
language, Rossi-Landi, with his notion of common speech, aimed at 
identifying the general conditions of language-thought at the basis of 
linguistic use and valid beyond the limits of any one given natural 
language. By no means an immediate description of real processes, 
common speech is a theoretical construction, a model proposing a 
method with interpretative functions, a hypothesis applicable to different 
languages (Rossi-Landi, 1961, p. 26). It refers to a set of techniques 
forming the necessary conditions for the happy realization of expression 
and communication, techniques which in their repeatability and 
constancy are common to all human beings, in Ponzio's words (1990c, 
p. 132), it concerns 
[...] fundamental categories, structures, signantia and signata of 
various description because the human situation is what it is, 
biologically and socially, all over the earth in spite of relevant 
local variations. 
As such common speech is not bound to national-cultural 
spheres but is an international phenomenon, it is not the theoretical 
expression of the historical processes of linguistic and ideological 
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unification and centralization, of the "centripetal forces" in language 
says Bakhtin, it is not connected with the notion of langue. As 
Rossi-Landi maintains (1961, p. 169) in his critique of the dichotomy 
between linguistic system and individual speaking, between langue and 
parole, between that which is permanent in language and innovation, 
between inventum and inventio, the notion of common speech, intended 
as the set of constant and reproducible characteristics of language, as 
language-in-general-as-human-work, cannot be reductively attributed to 
just one of the two poles forming such dichotomies but involves them 
both (for a detailed analysis and further development of Rossi-Landi's 
theoretical stances in its various aspects, see in particular Ponzio's 
monograph of 1988 Rossi-Landi e la filosofia del linguaggio). 
3. Translation, alterity and ideology 
The verbal sign is an ideological sign par excellence, says Bakhtin. As 
an ideological phenomenon it refracts historico-social reality. The verbal 
sign has an ideological function, an ideological materiality. It refracts 
ideologically the social reality in which it is produced and used. Insofar 
as it is ideological, the verbal sign may be characterized as a 
historico-social event. 
Though nonverbal signs contribute towards shaping reality, the 
modelling influence of verbal signs is far greater. Reality as we 
experience it is organized verbally — a conviction at the basis of 
extreme forms of linguistic relativity. Supporters of this theory maintain 
that the structure of a given language wholly determines a language 
user's thoughts and worldview as well as his nonverbal behaviour, so 
that, echoing Wittgenstein (1953), we could say that our world is the 
language we speak. For his part, by contrast with the idealism of 
linguistic relativity, with opposing neopositivist stances and the 
conception of language, thought and reality as separate though variously 
interacting entities, Rossi-Landi stresses the dialectic interaction between 
thought, language and the economic, social and cultural context in the 
formation of ideologies and worldviews: 
Language is immediately present, but certainly not in the form 
of a constant linguistic capital, capable of being isolated from 
everything else, and made to determine nothing less than 
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thought. If we want to study the way in which thought is 
determined in all its developments up to the point of including 
spontaneous and sophisticated worldviews, we shall have to 
turn our attention to the sum total of economic, social and 
cultural conditions. We shall find that what we describe as 
linguistic is, if anything, a part of their phenomenology 
(Rossi-Landi, 1973, p. 70). 
By constrast with the plurilingualism and polylogism of 
linguistic relativity which, while recognizing the great multiplicity of 
languages and worldviews, elaborates the thesis of incommunicability, 
incommensurability, untranslatability, of linguistic universes devoid of 
the possibility of relating to each other dialogically, and by contrast 
with the opposite extreme of reducing such multiplicity to unity, 
characteristic of mental innatism, biologism, linguistic universalism, 
Rossi-Landi highlights the dialectic-dialogic nature of the relation 
between language, thought and objective reality. Language shapes our 
worldview and, at the same time, is the product of relations among 
human beings, and among human beings and the "natural" environment. 
Language not only determines social praxis but is determined by it. 
However, semantic correspondences between verbal signs and objectual 
reality, that is, worldviews, are never direct or immediate. There is no 
such things as "hard dry facts," says Welby, who also stresses the sign-
mediated nature of consciousness, language and reality, and of the 
relation between consciousness and reality. The objective world takes 
shape and may be perceived in its parts thanks to the mediation of 
language which in turn is the product of social practice. Awareness of 
reality is mediated awareness conditioned by previous, individual and 
collective experiences, by the specific values, ideologies and orientations 
of a given community, all of which find their most resonant expression 
in the verbal sign. 
So-called "semantico-ideological pliancy" characterizes the 
verbal sign and is expressed in its possibility of transferring or 
transmuting into varying ideological fields whereby acquiring new 
meanings and functions. The plurivocality, ambivalence, ambiguity and 
semantico-ideological pliancy of the verbal sign is given in its 
translatability into other verbal interpretam signs belonging to different 
semantic classes, that have different meanings. By contrast with signals 
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which in comparison with verbal signs are endowed with a low level of 
signness (see Bakhtin-Volosinov, 1973), verbal signs may be 
translated/interpreted by interprétants not only from different sign 
systems, as in the case of signals, but also from different classes of 
meaning. 
Ideological multiaccentuality, projectual pluridirectionality, 
valuational heterogeneity, polylogism are all implied by the condition 
of plurilingualism, polyphony, plurivocality. Semantic alterity involves 
ideological alterity which concerns the valuational accentuation, 
practical orientation, and operative intentionality taken on by the word 
in concrete communicative contexts. Consequently, answering 
comprehension involves interpretative choices and participation not only 
at the semantic level but also at the ideological. It elicits a point of view 
that is other with respect to identity, an ideological stance, the 
development of a critical linguistico-ideological consciousness. All this 
is connected in Bakhtin with what he calls "theme" or "actual sense" 
which, indeed, is determined in semântico- ideological translation 
processes, and to what Welby intends by "significance" within the 
framework of her particular version of the theory of meaning, or 
signifies. 
For Welby the term "significance" indicates the maximum 
expression value of a sign as it is enhanced through ongoing 
translative-interprétative processes; the sign viewed not solely as a 
cognitive entity but in its axiological dimension as well, in its relation 
to values. The more a sign is subject to transference, transformation, 
transmutation, transfiguration, and above all, transvaluation, the more 
it is translated into the signs of different spheres of knowledge, 
experience, ideology, into different languages, the more its significance 
and ultimate value increases. Even the simple rewording — to 
paraphrase Jakobson, intrasemiotic translation —, of an expression in 
different linguistic registers, according to different communicative 
situations, is possible thanks to the development of a metalinguistic 
semantico-ideological consciousness. Ongoing translative-interprétative 
processes sharpen perception of even the most unsuspected links and 
connections, of aspects of knowledge and truth previously unknown: the 
more the sign is translated consciously and dialectically into different 
fields of thought and practical experience, the more its significance, 
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import and value increases. In the framework of signifies it is 
particularly the term "transvaluation" (cf. Welby, 1983, p. 26) that 
captures this aspect of the connection between translation and meaning: 
"transvaluation" underlines the link between translation processes in this 
"significai" sense and Welby's triadic subdivision of signifying 
processes into "sense," "meaning" and "significance" — three terms that 
indicate the progressive advance from the lower to the higher degrees 
of semantico-ideological expression value in concrete communicative 
interaction (cf. Welby, 1983, pp. 5-6; see also her paper "Signifies", 
now in Welby, 1985). 
Steiner, as mentioned above, speaks of freedom as it is 
determined in dialogic plurilingualism, in alterity, in the possibility of 
moving across languages and worldviews. Working in a similar 
direction and in the light of studies conducted on the connection 
between meaning and value not only by Welby or Bakhtin, but also by 
such different thinkers as Peirce (cf. 1956), Charles Morris (1901-1979; 
cf. 1964) and Emmanuel Lévinas (cf. 1989), it is worth observing that 
another fundamental relation to emerge is that between translation and 
the concept of responsibility, between translation and the freedom of 
unlimited, absolute responsibility. "Responsibility is what first enables 
one to catch sight of and conceive of value," says Lévinas (1989, p. 
113). Translative-interprétative processes involve the capacity for 
alterity, the possibility of overcoming the limits of one's own identity, 
of one's own restricted responsibilities as they are reassuringly defined 
in professional roles, social status, political orientation, ideological 
convictions, etc. The capacity for alterity does not imply, therefore, a 
situation of indifferent, undiscriminating co-existence among a plurality 
of closed languages, worlds and subjects, but, on the contrary, involves 
the risky responsibility of crossing over boundaries and looking at the 
other, of perceiving the other in a relation of dialogic participation. 
The discussion concerning the translation of Theses on 
Feuerbach by Karl Marx (1818-1883) is worth mentioning at this stage 
in the light of our focus on the relation between semiotics, ideology and 
translation theory. Immediate reference is to the debate which took 
place between Adam Schaff and Lucien Sève in the French journal 
L'Homme et la Société in 1971 and 1972 concerning the official French 
translations specifically of Marx's sixth thesis on Feuerbach. This 
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debate involved numerous French intellectuals (in addition to Schaffand 
Sève, other scholars to have figured in the discussion either directly or 
indirectly were Louis Althusser, Auguste Cornu, Roger Garaudy), and 
beyond these the international community at large with a concern for 
Marxist theory. Indeed, thanks also to the work of Ponzio (cf. 1975), 
who has collected the various interventions relevant to this debate in 
Italian translation in a volume entitled Marxismo e umanesimo, we are 
now able to extend the scope of the discussion beyond the official 
French translations to include the Polish, Russian, Italian and eventually 
the English. 
Even though interest in this precise issue may seem rather 
restricted given its specialized nature, it is in fact of great import 
considering its determining role in the global interpretation of Marxist 
theory — many scholars believe that the Theses on Feuerbach are the 
key to Marx's thought even if they often give rise to different 
interpretations owing to their elliptical and at times metaphorical nature. 
Furthermore, and for what concerns us more specifically here, 
discussion of this particular issue is important because it serves to 
highlight the existence of a close relation between translation and 
ideology: to translate in one way rather than in another, as in the case 
of this text by Marx, is full of ideological implications. Consequently 
the solution to this particular controversy is significant at the 
philological, philosophical and political levels, and for the case in point 
it is crucial in establishing the validity of Sève's overall interpretation 
of Marxism and of his criticism of existentialism, structuralism, 
Althusser's theoretical anti- humanism, etc. 
Sève considers the translation of Marx's sixth thesis by Schaff 
as erroneous and as the result of the latter's misinterpretation of 
marxism, of his reading of Marx in a humanistic-speculative key, 
involving consequences at the political level also. The whole debate 
ultimately concerned the relation between Marxism and humanism: the 
interpretation of thesis VI may be viewed as a reflection of the general 
attitude taken towards the relations between Marxism and humanism, 
ideology and science, scientific socialism and Marxist humanism, 
Marx's youthful writings and his mature works, all of which concern 
the meaning and value of Marxism generally (cf. Ponzio, 1975, p. 6). 
And as Schaff observes, though centred upon the translation and 
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interpretation of just a few expressions in the Theses, the debate extends 
beyond "words" and can only be fully understood by looking "behind 
the screen," by inquiring into the history of left-wing political 
movements, and by relating the consequences of this debate to the 
"controversy on the humanistic contents of socialism, the controversy 
on the means of overcoming the effects and consequences of Stalinism 
in the Communist movement, etc." (Schaff in Ponzio, 1975. p. 114). 
The immediate object of discussion and controversy concerns 
the correct translation of certain propositions in Theses on Feuerbach, 
all of which contain the German word Wesen as in the key expression 
das menschliche Wesen in thesis VI. Schaff contends that the recurrent 
translation of this expression with "the essence of man," generally 
consolidated by tradition, is wrong. The German word Wesen is 
ambiguous: it counts up to eleven distinct groups of meanings, each 
with numerous semantic nuances. Two of these meanings are relevant 
in relation to the debate in question and correspond, respectively, to the 
Latin "ens" and "essentia" English "being" and "essence," French "être" 
and "essence" Italian "essere" and "essenza" intended as "living being" 
on the one hand, and "essence of things," "that which is essential" as 
opposed to incidental, on the other. These languages then do not dispose 
of a single and ambiguous term corresponding to the German "Wesen" 
though this word does have an equivalent for polysemantism and 
plurivocality in the Russian "sochtchestwo" and in the Polish "istota" 
Consequently, as opposed to such languages as Russian and Polish 
which contain just an equivalent to the German "Wesen" as ambiguous 
as in French, English or Italian translations, a decision must be made: 
the meaning of the word "Wesen" must be decided each time it occurs 
in a given context, its sense determined for it to be appropriately 
rendered in the target language. 
The situation gets even more complicated when we consider 
that two different and even contrasting official translations of the Theses 
are available in the French language: in fact the particular expression we 
are concerned with here, das menschliche Wesen, is rendered either as 
"l'essence humaine" (Œuvres complètes de Karl Marx, A. Costes, ed., 
1937) or as "l'être humain" (Œuvres choisies de Marx-Engels, Éditions 
du Progrès, Moscow, 1946). These different translations bear 
philosophical implications given that Marx is accordingly interpreted as 
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discussing either the "essence of man" or the concrete "human being," 
the real human individual defined in his relations not only with nature 
but also with society of which, insofar as he is a social being, he is the 
product. 
It should be observed that most official translations in various 
languages of Theses on Feuerbach derive from the original Russian 
translation. Strangely enough, the Russian translator Plechanov, in 1892, 
chose to render the German "Wesen" by the unambiguous Russian word 
"suschtschnost" (that is, "essence," "Wesenheit"), rather than by 
"suschtschestwo" which, similarly to the Polish "istota" has multiple 
meanings and is consequently closer to the German original. Having 
made this particular lexical choice, the Russian translator — a renowned 
authority, observes Schaff — was in fact to condition this text's future 
philosophical and political interpretations. 
In French, as in Italian and English, the same word cannot be 
used indifferently as in the case of "Wesen" "istota" "suschtschestwo" 
and under the influence of the original Russian translation, "Wesen" is 
translated prevalently with the equivalents of "essentia" a solution 
which Schaff refuses in favour of the equivalents of "ens" He makes 
his decision by combining the results of a grammatical analysis with 
analysis of the philosophical context. In the face of such an ambiguous 
word as "Wesen" Schaff avers that the sense in which it is intended 
may be solved by appealing to the rules of German syntax. 
If the expression "das Wesen" is followed by a noun in the 
genitive, it means "essence." Therefore, "das Wesen des Christentums" 
which is also the title of a work by Feuerbach, means "the essence of 
Christianity," and correspondingly "das Wesen des Religion" means "the 
essence of religion," "das Wesen des Menschen" "the essence of man." 
"Wesen" followed by "of something" or "of somebody" functions in the 
sense of "essence." On the other hand, if "Wesen" is preceded by a 
qualifying adjective, it means "being." Therefore, "das christliche 
Wesen" means "the christian being," "das religiöse Wesen" means "the 
religious being," "das menschliche Wesen" "the human being." In all 
these cases, as the syntax tells us, we are dealing with a "being" that is 
respectively Christian, religious, human. 
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In the light of the connection not only between "sign" and 
"ideology," but above all between "sense" and "ideology," it would 
seem that for a semiotic approach to translation the problem of 
ideology must also be taken into account. The task of translation can 
only be properly accomplished if the translator is able to grasp and 
express the "sense" of a text: to remain at the level of the mere 
understanding of its "meaning" is not sufficient. Given that sense, as 
seen above, is no less than the evaluational orientation, standpoint, and 
expression to varying degrees of social planning, it is connected with 
ideology. Consequently what emerges is not so much the ideological 
character of translation as the inevitability of taking into account the 
problem of sense and therefore of ideology in translation theory (which 
I believe must necessarily be a semiotics of translation). 
It is in this perspective that I have referred to the work of such 
thinkers as Sapir and Whorf: their theory of linguistic relativity implies 
a specific theory of translation and a specific ideological conception 
which obviously influenced, indeed, is at the basis of their rather limited 
vision of the very possibility of translation. It should also be mentioned 
that the theory of linguistic relativity hides an ideology of an 
ethnic-cultural order, an ideological orientation turned to justifying the 
various real forms of separation and segregation with respect to 
populations that speak languages different from our own, for the case 
in point, the Ameridian, to which studies conducted by Sapir and Whorf 
directly refer (cf. Solimini, 1974, pp. 98-102; 1991, pp. 30-33). On the 
other hand, the discussion concerning Marx's Theses on Feuerbach also 
stresses how the problem of translation is at the same time the problem 
of the correct interpretation of the ideology expressed in a text and, 
therefore, the problem of the ideological stance that the 
interpreter-translator must choose to take towards the text. Consideration 
of this issue as well helps shed light upon the close relation between 
ideology theory and translation theory viewed semiotically. Expressed 
differently, my focus throughout this study on the relation between 
semiotics, ideology and translation theory is motivated by the fact that, 
for an adequate treatment of the problem of translation, we must 
necessarily deal with the problem of the relation between "signification" 
and "significance/* or "semantics" and "pragmatics " or if we prefer, 
between "meaning" and "ideological sense." 
University of Bari, Italy 
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